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ABSTRACT
Two recent reviews report that the empirical findings in information technology outsourcing
(ITO) research are frequently inconsistent with the prevailing dominant analytical framework of
transaction cost economics (TCE). While employing similar methodologies, the two reviews propose
different strategies to resolve the inconsistencies. One is to improve the methodological rigor,
specifically, the operationalization of TCE constructs. The other is to abandon TCE in favor of a new
analytical framework. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the empirical findings on the choice of
contract type as a function of task uncertainty. The results support both strategies. Refining the
operationalization of TCE constructs, specifically of task uncertainty, would have improved the
reliability of findings on TCE-based relationships between task uncertainty and the choice of contract
type. However, independent of such methodological improvements, TCE is of limited relevance in
recent ITO research for predicting the choice of contract type. Generalizing these findings, we
conclude that ITO research requires a new analytical framework to further develop the theory of ITO
and to provide sound guidance to the ITO industry.
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HIGHLIGHTS
•

We use meta-analysis to review empirical findings on the relationship between task
uncertainty and choice of contract type in the ITO literature.

•

The dataset for the meta-analysis contains 22 independent empirical samples that
include data on 6,479 ITO engagements.

•

We find that the relationship between task uncertainty and choice of contract type is
contingent on the operationalization of task uncertainty and on the period to which the
data refers.

•

We argue that a core assumption of transaction cost economics on how uncertainty
affects contractual governance is no longer applicable to ITO research.

•

We conclude that ITO research needs a new analytical framework to further develop
the theory of ITO.

Keywords:

IT outsourcing; Transaction Cost Economics; Task uncertainty; Choice of contract
type; Time-and-material contract; Fixed-price contract
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INTRODUCTION
Information technology outsourcing (ITO) theory has contributed significantly to the
development of best practice in the ITO industry. For example, ITO research examines the decision to
outsource (e.g., Watjatrakul, 2005) and how to establish effective formal and relational governance
for ITO engagements (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In this literature, transaction cost economics
(TCE) is the dominant analytical framework from which many of the predictions in ITO research are
derived (See Aubert et al., 2012; Dibbern et al., 2004; Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011; Klein, 2002;
Lacity et al., 2011).
Two recent reviews report significant inconsistencies among the empirical findings for TCEbased predictions in the ITO literature (See Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011; Lacity et al., 2011). The
reviews employ similar methodologies and report similar levels of inconsistency. However, they
present different explanations for the inconsistencies. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) argue that
measurement errors and construct validity threats explain the inconsistencies. They call for more
rigorous methodology, including the operationalization of TCE constructs. In contrast, Lacity et al.
(2011) argue that TCE is an increasingly obsolete analytical framework for ITO research. They call
for the development of an “endogenous” ITO theory.
We adopt meta-analysis to investigate the two explanations in the specific context of the
relationship between task uncertainty (TU) and the choice of contract type (CT) in the ITO literature.
We choose this relationship because TCE makes specific and unambiguous predictions about the
choice of CT as a function of TU. To examine the two explanations, the meta-analysis investigates
whether the cumulative findings for the relationship between TU and choice of CT in the ITO
literature support the conclusions by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and/or by Lacity et al. (2011)
for the inconsistencies between empirical findings and TCE-based predictions.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we derive two hypotheses that model the assumptions
that underpin the different conclusions drawn by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and by Lacity et
al. (2011). Next, we explain how meta-analysis enables us to test each of the hypotheses, which would
not be possible using the vote-counting methodology adopted by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011)
and Lacity et al. (2011). The results support both hypotheses. We discuss the results, potential
limitations, and implications for theory and practice. In conclusion, we agree with Lacity et al. (2011)
that the core challenge for future ITO research is to develop a new rigorous and powerful analytical
framework.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In IT outsourcing research, researchers frequently adopt the analytical framework of
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to model two critical decisions in ITO engagements. One is the
decision to outsource IT, which is predominantly modeled as a function of asset specificity (Crook et
al., 2013). This is commonly referred to as the ‘make-or-buy’ decision (Riordan and Williamson,
1985). The other decision and the focus of this paper is on the choice of “governance features”
(Williamson, 1991, p. 269). This choice is modeled as a function of uncertainty. Governance features
are “special adaptive mechanisms to effect realignment and restore efficiency when beset by
unanticipated disturbances” (Williamson, 1991, p. 272).
Here, we examine the empirical findings on the choice of contract type (CT), which is an
important example of the application of TCE-based governance features in the ITO literature.
Realigning transactions in response to disturbances incurs costs (Williamson, 2008). The choice
between different contract types, specifically time-and-material (TM) contracts and fixed-price (FP)
contracts, allocates those additional costs to the parties to the contract (Hoermann et al., 2015). In the
ITO context, monitoring costs and renegotiation costs are allocated to the vendor or the client (OseiBryson and Ngwenyama, 2006; Susarla et al., 2009).
Under TM contracts, vendors are remunerated on the basis of reported working hours or
working days. The client carries the risk of budget overruns. The client incurs monitoring costs to
limit the risk of vendors charging for more resources than the project goals require. In FP contracts,
budget overruns affect the project profitability for the vendor (Ethiraj et al., 2005; Gopal and Koka,
2012; Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Gopal et al., 2003).
Therefore, FP contracts provide strong incentives for vendors to manage projects efficiently
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Corts and Singh, 2004; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). For example, vendors
assign more trained personnel to FP projects compared with TM projects (Arora and Asundi, 1999;
Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). In general, FP contracts incur lower monitoring costs compared
with TM contracts because of the different incentive structures.
In contrast, renegotiation costs are higher under FP contracts compared with TM contracts
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Corts and Singh, 2004; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). FP contracts typically
include detailed project plans, specify the functional requirements, service levels, and costs (Fink et
al., 2013). When unforeseen contingencies occur, project specifications must be renegotiated, which
generates additional costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). This is not the case under TM contracts, which,
compared with FP contracts, include more coarse-grained plans that allow for adjustments to
specifications during the course of the project (Fink et al., 2013). So, under TM contracts, vendors are
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more willing to accept adjustments without the need for costly renegotiations (Kalnins and Mayer,
2004; Susarla et al., 2009).
TCE models this choice between FP contracts and TM contracts as a problem of minimizing
transaction costs, which are a function of task uncertainty (TU). Indeed, ITO engagements “could well
become nonviable when the frequency of disturbances reaches a high level” (Williamson, 1991, p.
291). In high TU contexts, the lower renegotiation costs under TM contracts compared with FM
contracts outweigh the lower monitoring costs under FP contracts compared with TM contracts. In
low TU contexts, the lower monitoring costs under FP contracts compared with TM contracts
outweigh the lower renegotiation costs under TM contracts compared with FM contracts (See, for
example, Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Dey et al., 2010; Kalnins and Mayer,
2004; Susarla et al., 2009). Formally, TCE predicts that the frequency with which TM contracts are
chosen instead of FP contracts is a positive function of TU.
Restricting our meta-analysis to the relationship between TU and choice of CT allows us to
investigate whether the inconsistent empirical findings in the ITO literature are a function of the
methodologies employed and/or the relevance of the TCE analytical framework. To test the former
explanation, we examine whether the correlation between TU and CT is contingent on how TU is
operationalized (See Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011).
To do this, we compare the effect of the five measures of, or proxies for, TU on the magnitude
of the relationship between TU and CT. The five constructs are technological uncertainty (e.g.,
Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Maruping and Ahuja, 2012), requirements
uncertainty (e.g., Gopal and Koka, 2012; Huckman and Staats, 2011; Rai et al., 2009; Susarla, 2012;
Susarla et al., 2009; Tiwana, 2010), technological complexity (e.g., Bapna et al., 2012; Chen and
Bharadwaj, 2009a; Ethiraj et al., 2005; Gefen et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2008; Rai et al., 2009;
Susarla, 2012), organizational complexity (e.g., Chen and Heng, 2012; Maruping and Ahuja, 2012;
Pee et al., 2010; Staats et al., 2012; Weber et al., 2011) and project size (e.g., Argyres et al., 2007;
Ethiraj et al., 2005; Mani et al., 2012; Ramachandran and Gopal, 2010; Staats et al., 2011; Staats et
al., 2012). Formally, we use meta-analysis to test:
Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of the relationship between TU and CT reported in the ITO
literature is a function of the operationalization of TU.
In contrast, the explanation according to Lacity et al. (2011) is that the frequent inconsistencies
among the empirical findings for TCE-based predictions are the result of changes in ITO management
practices in response to the increasingly competitive and consolidated ITO market (Manning, 2013).
For example, vendors have become subject to powerful market pressure to control costs, reducing the
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importance of monitoring costs. Management practices, including standardization, centralization and
modularization, have enabled ITO vendors to develop contractual governance mechanisms, which
include effective risk buffers, to manage both FP and TM contracts efficiently and effectively.
At the same time, ITO clients are becoming better informed due to increasing market
transparency (Reimann et al., 2010), which decreases renegotiation costs. Together, these effects on
vendors and clients have reduced the relative transaction cost differentials between FM and TM
contracts, and, therefore, reduced the relationship between TU and choice of CT. So, the benefits
predicted by TCE from the appropriate choice of CT as a function of TU have declined over time.
Formally, we use meta-analysis to test:
Hypothesis 2:

The magnitude of the relationship between TU and CT reported in the ITO
literature is a function of the period of investigation.

METHODOLOGY
Meta-analysis is a suite of quantitative techniques to synthesize empirical research findings
across multiple studies (Glass, 1976; Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). The input
data are effect sizes, frequently correlation coefficients, from individual studies addressing the
relationship of interest (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). Meta-analysis utilizes the total sample size by
aggregating across the individual studies to estimate more reliable effect sizes compared with
traditional review procedures, including narrative reviews or vote-counting approaches (Glass et al.,
1981; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001). In this way, our meta-analysis
complements the studies of Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and of Lacity et al. (2011), which are
based on the vote-counting methodology.
Meta-analysis is a widely accepted methodology in the reference disciplines of information
systems (IS) research. It is also increasingly being used in IS research (See, for example, He and
King, 2008; Joseph et al., 2007; Sabherwal et al., 2006; Sharma and Yetton, 2003, 2007; Sharma et
al., 2009; Wu and Lederer, 2009). In the following sections, we describe the literature search, coding,
and analysis.
Literature Search
The relationship between TU and choice of CT is the subject of a major research stream in the
ITO literature (See Fink et al., 2013; Gefen et al., 2008; Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Gopal et
al., 2003; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Susarla et al., 2009). This body of research is sufficiently large to
support a meta-analysis to examine Hypotheses 1 and 2. The sample of individual studies in the meta-
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analysis consists of empirical studies reported in journals, forthcoming journal papers, conference
proceedings, dissertations, and working papers. Conference proceedings, dissertations, and working
papers are included to address the “file-drawer problem”. This refers to the issue that published
studies, compared with unpublished studies, may systematically overestimate effect sizes (Rosenthal,
1979).
Following the recommendations by Cooper (2010) and meta-analyses in IS (See Sharma and
Yetton, 2003, 2007; Wu and Lederer, 2009), we conducted four complementary literature searches to
minimize the probability of failing to identify relevant studies. First, we conducted a systematic
keyword search in the following databases1: Business Source Premier, JSTOR, ScienceDirect,
ABI/INFORM, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, The Association for Information Systems
Electronic Library (AISeL), ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, and WorldCat Dissertations and
Theses2. Second, we conducted backward and forward searches (Webster and Watson, 2002). Third,
we searched for working papers and forthcoming journal papers by screening the websites of key
authors identified in the previous steps, conducting keyword searches in Google, and searching the
Social Science Research Network (SSRN). Fourth, we sent requests for unpublished working papers
using the AISworld and AOM OCIS mailing lists.
We included a study in the final meta-analytical dataset if the study satisfied three criteria.
First, the study investigates ITO engagements as its unit of analysis. Second, the study measures the
choice of CT and one or more operationalizations of TU. Multiple studies based on the same sample
were included only when each of the studies reports at least one operationalization of TU that is not
reported in the others. Third, the study reports the sample size, the years for which the data was
collected, and the correlation coefficients between TU and choice of CT. For the studies in which any
of these statistics were missing, we contacted the corresponding author of the study and requested the
missing statistics. This process identified three additional studies.

1

2

Following Sabherwal et al. (2006) we used several keywords related to IS outsourcing projects (including
“software”, “information system”, “information technology”, “outsourcing”) and several keywords related to
contract type (including, “contract”, “fixed price”, “time and materials”, “cost plus”) and their variants (e.g.,
“fixed-price”).
The databases included the major journals and conference proceedings in the IS and management disciplines
such as Management Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ), Information Systems Research (ISR), Journal
of Management Information Systems (JMIS), Management Science (MS), Academy of Management Journal
(AMJ), Strategic Management Journal (SMJ), International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS),
Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), European Conference on Information Systems
(ECIS), and Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS).
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The final meta-analytical dataset includes 28 studies based on 22 independent samples3. The
dataset includes data on 6,479 ITO engagements. Of the 28 studies, 59% do not support the logic of
TCE for the effect of TU on choice of CT. This is similar in magnitude to the findings in the two
reviews: Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) report that 44% of TCE-based hypotheses are not
supported and Lacity et al. (2011) report that 51% of TCE-based hypotheses are not supported.
Coding
We extracted the following information from each study in the final meta-analytical dataset:
sample size, start year and end year of the sample4, and the name and description of all variables that
were used by the authors to measure properties of TU. For each measure of TU, we extracted the
correlation coefficient between CT and TU, and the reliability coefficient to estimate the measurement
error. In total, we extracted 92 correlation coefficients for the relationship between TU and choice of
CT as input for coding the dependent variable (choice of CT) and the independent variable (TU) for
each study.
The dependent variable
The individual studies included in the final meta-analytical dataset operationalize the choice of
CT as a binary variable. Where necessary, we converted the reported correlation coefficients, so that
higher values correspond to stronger preferences for a TM contract compared with an FP contract and
lower values correspond to a stronger preference for an FP contract compared with a TM contract.
The independent variable
TCE-based research operationalizes TU with variables that relate to particular properties of TU,
including technological uncertainty and requirements uncertainty, or proxies that are highly
interrelated with TU, including technological complexity, organizational complexity and project size
(See Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Fink et al., 2013; Kalnins and Mayer,
2004)5.
We coded each variable of the 92 correlation coefficients according to how the authors of each
study operationalized TU. For instance, we coded the level of familiarity with particular programming
3
4

5

Appendix 1 provides an overview of the final meta-analytical sample. Furthermore, a ‘*’ in the references
denotes a study as part of the final meta-analytical sample.
The start year and end year define the period of investigation. In studies using secondary data, this is the
period of time for which the data was extracted from public or private archives. In other studies, this is the
period of time during which the authors collected the data.
Definitions and coding examples for the different operationalizations of TU are presented in Appendix 2. A
complete mapping of the study variables to the different operationalizations of technological uncertainty is
presented in Appendix 3.
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languages as technological uncertainty (See Banerjee and Duflo (2000). This process identified 10
effect sizes for technological uncertainty, 10 effect sizes for requirements uncertainty, 19 effect sizes
for technological complexity, 22 effect sizes for organizational complexity, and 31 effect sizes for
project size.
This process involved judgment by the coders (Heugens and Lander, 2009). To minimize
coding errors, we adopted the protocol recommended by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). Two coders
independently coded each study. The initial Cohen (1960) kappa was 0.94, which demonstrates a high
inter-coder reliability. Disagreements between the coders were resolved very quickly through
discussion.
Analysis
The unit of analysis is the zero-order, Pearson correlation coefficient between CT and TU. This
is a well understood, scale-free measure of the relationship between two variables (Rosenthal and
DiMatteo, 2001). The Fisher z transformation, a potential alternative unit of analysis, was not adopted
because it introduces an expected positive bias that is larger than the expected negative bias when
using untransformed correlation coefficients (See Hall and Brannik, 2002; Hunter and Schmidt,
2004).
We corrected the correlation coefficients for measurement error by dividing each correlation
coefficient by the product of the square root of the reliability coefficient for the TU and CT variables
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). If a measurement was based on a single-item or a proxy variable, we
adopted a conservative standard of 0.8 for the reliability coefficient (Bommer et al., 1995; Dalton et
al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Jiang et al., 2012; Sleesman et al., 2010).
We prepared the final meta-analytical dataset in three steps. The first step estimates
independent effect sizes for each of the 22 independent samples included in the meta-analytical
dataset. This avoids biased estimates that would result from the inclusion of interdependent effect
sizes in the meta-analysis (See He and King, 2008; Palmatier et al., 2006). When a sample was used
to measure more than one variable related to TU, for example, both project size and requirements
uncertainty, we averaged the effect sizes of all variables (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Palmatier et al.,
2006). The initial 92 correlation coefficients were combined to estimate 22 independent effect sizes at
the sample-level.
The second step estimates independent effect sizes for each of the operationalizations of TU.
When a study reports more than one variable related to a particular operationalization of TU, for
example, the length of the ITO engagement and the contract value, which both refer to project size as
an operationalization of TU, we averaged the corresponding effect sizes (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004;
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Palmatier et al., 2006). The initial 92 correlation coefficients were combined to estimate 64
independent effect sizes for the different operationalization of TU. This avoids biased estimates that
would result from including interdependent effect sizes for the different operationalizations of TU
(See He and King, 2008; Palmatier et al., 2006).
The third step ensures an unbiased analysis of potential temporal effects as the final metaanalytical dataset includes samples that cover more than 20 years (e.g. Chen and Heng, 2012). We
partition the final meta-analytical dataset into two subsets using a median-split based on the start year
of the period of investigation (𝑆𝑌𝑆#$%&'( = 1999). The subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ includes 11
independent samples that have a start year prior to or including 1999.
The other subset ‘SYS > 1999’ includes 11 independent samples with a start year of 2000 or
later. While the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ contain data beyond 19996, the subset ‘SYS > 1999’ does not
include data prior to 2000. Using the same logic for partitioning at the level of operationalizations of
TU results in 32 independent effect sizes for different operationalizations of TU prior to and including
1999 and 32 independent effect sizes for different operationalizations of TU post 1999.
Following recent meta-analyses in IS (See Joseph et al., 2007; Sabherwal et al., 2006), we
adopted the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) random effects model. Weighting the correlation coefficients
by sample size and reliability, the following meta-analytic outcomes were estimated: the number of
effect sizes (𝑘), the total sample size (𝑁), the average corrected correlation (expected rho; 𝜌), the
standard deviation of rho (𝑆𝐷2 ), and the 95-percent confidence interval around the expected rho
(𝐶𝐼2;.78 )7.
Positive values of 𝜌 indicate that the frequency with which TM contracts are chosen instead of
FP contracts is a positive function of TU. Negative values of 𝜌 indicate that the frequency with which
TM contracts are chosen instead of FP contracts is a negative function of TU. The relationship of TU
and choice of CT is statistically significant when 𝐶𝐼2;.78 does not include zero.
In addition, we calculated three meta-analytic outcomes to assess the generalizability of the
results: the 80-percent credibility interval around the expected rho (𝐶𝑅2;.;< ); the percentage of
variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts (%𝑉); and the Cochran (1954) chi-square statistic
for heterogeneity (𝑄). In contrast to 𝐶𝐼2;.78 , which refers to the accuracy of 𝜌, the 𝐶𝑅2;.;< refers to the
distribution of 𝜌 and is used to assess the generalizability of the 𝜌 (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). When

6
7

This source of bias is discussed below under the heading of test procedure.
We used Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) formula for individually corrected correlation coefficients to calculate
the standard error of the estimated average correlations: 𝑆𝐸2 = 𝑆𝐷A /√𝑘.
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𝐶𝑅2;.;< is large or includes zero, 𝜌 does not generalize (Whitener, 1990). Instead, the distribution of 𝜌
is assumed to be heterogeneous. Similarly, if %𝑉 is less than 75 percent, Hunter and Schmidt (2004)
suggest that the relationship is heterogeneous. When 𝑄 is significant, 𝜌 does not generalize. Instead, it
should be interpreted as the expected value of a number of effects rather than a common true effect
(Hedges and Olkin, 1985).
Test procedure
We test Hypotheses 1 and 2 as follows. First, we examine the hypotheses using the 22
independent effect sizes partitioned into two subsets (SYS ≤ 1999 and SYS > 1999). We use the
ANOVA-based analysis procedure proposed by Borenstein et al. (2009). This is based on a
decomposition of 𝑄, Cochran’s (1954) chi-square statistic for heterogeneity (See Park and Shaw,
2013). A significant 𝑄D&EF&( -statistic is interpreted as showing that the remaining heterogeneity within
the subsets includes a number of effects rather than a common true effect. This would support
Hypothesis 1. In that case, a significant 𝑄D&EF&( -statistic would justify a meta-analytic examination of
the different operationalizations of TU.
A significant 𝑄G$ED$$( -statistic is interpreted as showing that a significant proportion of the
heterogeneity in the total dataset is explained by the moderator variable. So, a significant 𝑄G$ED$$( statistic would support Hypothesis 2. In that case, the effect size is a function of the period of
investigation.
The estimated effect sizes of TU and CT for the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ would be biased when
Hypothesis 2 is true because this subset includes data on ITO engagements during 2000 and later (See
Appendix 1). For example, the sample used by Chen and Bharadwaj (2009a) starts in 1993 and ends
in 2003. So when Hypothesis 2 is true, the estimated effect sizes for the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ would
include a negative bias. The estimated effect size for the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ would be less than the
true unbiased value. For the subset ‘SYS > 1999’, the estimated effect size would be unbiased as this
subset does not contain data on ITO engagements before 2000.
The test for Hypothesis 2 examines whether the expected effect size for the subset ‘SYS ≤
1999’ is significantly greater than the expected effect size for the subset ‘SYS > 1999’. So, the
negative bias in the estimates of the effect size for subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ increases the probability of a
false negative result and not for a false positive one. Therefore, a significant finding for the 𝑄G$ED$$( statistic is not subject to a potential internal validity threat. In addition, we conducted sensitivity
analyses for different start years of the period of investigation because the choice of a median split to
partition the final meta-analytical sample is somewhat arbitrary (See Appendix 4). The results
reported below are robust for different partitions.
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A significant 𝑄D&EF&( -statistic would justify a meta-analytic examination of the different
operationalizations of TU to test Hypothesis 1. Again, we use the ANOVA-based analysis procedure
based on the decomposition of 𝑄 (Borenstein et al., 2009). Here, a significant 𝑄G$ED$$(HI -statistic is
interpreted as support for Hypothesis 1, showing that a significant proportion of the heterogeneity in
each subset can be explained by the different operationalizations of TU. The median split partition by
SYS does not bias this test because the analysis is within each subset, not between them, which is the
case for the test of Hypothesis 2.
RESULTS
The results in Table 1 support Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of the relationship between TU and
CT reported in the ITO literature is a function of the operationalization of TU. The 𝑄D&EF&( -statistics
JKJNM777
JKJLM777
are significant (𝑄D&EF&(
= 22.92, p < 0.05; 𝑄D&EF&(
= 24.18, p < 0.05).

SYS ≤ 1999
SYS > 1999

𝒌
11
11

𝑵
3,096
3,152

𝝆
.15
.05

𝑺𝑫𝝆
𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓
.08
.08 : .21
.08 -.01 : .11

𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎
.05 : .25
-.05 : .15

%𝑽
.47
.45

𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏
22.92*
24.18*

𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏
9.09*

𝒌: Number of effect sizes; 𝑵: Total sample size; 𝝆: Expected rho; 𝑆𝐷2 : Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓 : 95% confidence interval around 𝜌;
𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎 : 80% credibility interval around 𝜌; %𝐕: Percentage of variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts; 𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 : Cochran’s chisquare statistic for heterogeneity that remains within the subset; 𝐐𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 : Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained
by the SYS; * 𝒑-value of 𝑄 < 0.05. A sensitivity analysis for different values of SYS is reported in Appendix 4.

Table 1.

The relationship between TU and choice of CT controlling for SYS

The results in Table 1 also support Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of the relationship between
TU and CT reported in the ITO literature is a function of the period of investigation. The 𝑄G$ED$$( statistic is significant (𝑄G$ED$$( = 9.09, p < 0.05). In the subset SYS ≤ 1999, the effect of TU on CT
(𝜌 = .15) is significantly larger than in the subset SYS > 1999 (𝜌 = .05). In addition, in the subset
SYS ≤ 1999, consistent with TCE, the effect of TU on CT is significant (𝐶𝐼2;.78 does not include
zero). In contrast, in the subset SYS > 1999, inconsistent with TCE, the effect of TU on CT is not
significant (𝐶𝐼2;.78 includes zero).8
The significant 𝑄D&EF&( -statistics in Table 1 motivated a meta-analytic examination of the
different operationalizations of TU. Table 2 shows that, consistent with the significant values for
𝑄D&EF&( reported in Table 1, the different operationalizations of TU have different effect sizes. The
𝑄G$ED$$(HI statistic is significant for both the subset SYS≤1999 (𝑄G$ED$$(HI = 34.53, p < 0.05) and
the subset SYS>1999 (𝑄G$ED$$(HI = 23.74, p < 0.05). This supports Hypothesis 1: The
operationalizations of TU explain a significant proportion of the variance in the expected correlation
coefficients in each subset.
8

The sensitivity analysis presented in Appendix 4 shows that the test for Hypothesis 2 is robust and not
contingent on the choice of 1999/2000 to partition the data.
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Operationalization of TU
SYS ≤ 1999
Technological uncertainty
Requirements uncertainty
Technological complexity
Organizational complexity
Project size
SYS > 1999
Technological uncertainty
Requirements uncertainty
Technological complexity
Organizational complexity
Project size

𝒌

𝑵

𝝆

𝑺𝑫𝝆

𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓

𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏𝑻𝑼

2
3
10
6
11

559
640
2,986
1,826
3,090

.17
.29
.05
.12
.21

.15
.13
.06
.08
.10

-.06
.12
-.01
.03
.14

:
:
:
:
:

.40
.46
.11
.21
.28

34.53*

3
7
5
8
9

753
1,661
1,434
2,803
2,615

.05
.07
.02
-.06
.10

.04
.12
.11
.17
.21

-.05
-.03
-.09
-.18
-.04

:
:
:
:
:

.15
.18
.13
.07
.24

23.74*

𝑘: Number of effect sizes; 𝑁: Total sample size; 𝜌: Expected rho; 𝑆𝐷2 : Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝐶𝐼2;.78 : 95% confidence interval around 𝜌,
𝑄G$ED$$(HI : Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained by the operationalization of TU; *: 𝑝-value of 𝑄 < 0.05.

Table 2.

The relationship between TU and choice of CT controlling for SYS and the
operationalization of TU

The results in Table 2 are also consistent with Hypothesis 2. Three operationalizations of TU
(requirements uncertainty, organizational complexity, and project size) in subset SYS≤1999 have
significant effects on the choice of CT. In contrast, no operationalization of TU in the subset
SYS>1999 has a significant effect on the choice of CT (𝐶𝐼2;.78 includes zero for all
operationalizations of TU).
Secondary analysis
Table 3 reports the statistics for the studies for which the datasets included data only for years
post 1999. Inspecting Table 3, the estimates of the correlation coefficient between CT and TU (ρ)
appear to trend towards zero, from 0.05, for data collected after 1999, to 0.01, for data collected after
2005. The latter include data on 791 ITO engagements. The estimated correlation coefficients for the
most recent samples, post 2004 and post 2005, are trivially different from zero.
Consistent with the interpretation that ρ is declining for samples collected post 1999, the
Q rstusv statistic, which tests whether the estimates of ρ are stable, also decreases over this range of
years (SYS). The numbers of studies in the subsets are not large enough to test the above
interpretations. However, the patterns in Table 3 are consistent with Hypothesis 2 and with the effect
of TU on CT tending to zero over time.
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SYS after
1999
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005

𝒌
11
10
8
6
5
4

𝑵
3,152
2,914
2,606
1,867
872
791

𝝆
.05
.04
.04
.08
.03
.01

𝑺𝑫𝝆
.08
.07
.08
.06
.08
.03

𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓
-.01
: .11
-.03
: .10
-.03
: .11
.00
: .15
-.08
: .14
-.08
: .10

𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎
-.05
: .15
-.05
: .13
-.06
: .14
.00
: .16
-.07
: .14
-.03
: .04

%𝑽
.45
.51
.42
.56
.57
.92

𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏
24.18*
19.44*
18.73*
10.57
8.75
4.31

𝒌: Number of effect sizes; 𝑵: Total sample size; 𝝆: Expected rho; 𝑆𝐷2 : Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓 : 95% confidence interval around 𝜌;
𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎 : 80% credibility interval around 𝜌; %𝐕: Percentage of variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts; 𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 : Cochran’s chisquare statistic for heterogeneity that remains within the subset; 𝐐𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 : Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained
by the SYS

Table 3.

The relationship between TU and choice of CT for various SYS > 1999

DISCUSSION
Here, we begin by summarizing the findings for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Then, we consider five
limitations with respect to these findings. Finally, we generalize the findings to TCE-based
predictions in the ITO literature, and explore the implications for the theory and practice of ITO.
Findings
The results support both the explanation by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and the
explanation by Lacity et al. (2011) for the frequent inconsistencies between the empirical findings for
predictions based on TCE that are reported in the ITO literature. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011)
explain the inconsistent empirical findings as a function of measurement errors and construct validity
threats. Consistent with this explanation, the significant 𝑄D&EF&( -statistics in Table 1, and the diverse
range of effect sizes combined with the significant 𝑄G$ED$$(HI -statistics for each of the two subsets in
Table 2, show that the magnitude of the relationship between TU and choice of CT is contingent on
the operationalization of TU, independent of the period of investigation. Generalizing these findings,
and consistent with the explanation by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) , there is a major potential
construct validity threat to the findings in the ITO literature as a function of how variables are
operationalized.
Lacity et al. (2011) explain the inconsistent empirical findings in terms of TCE becoming an
increasingly obsolete analytical framework for ITO research. Consistent with this explanation, the
relationship between TU and choice of CT is a function of the period of investigation. In the early
research, the relationship between TU and CT is significantly positive as predicted by TCE. However,
in more recent research, the findings in Tables 1 and 3 show that the relationship between TU and CT
is non-significant and trending to zero.
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In combination, our results show that the two strategies proposed by Karimi-Alaghehband et al.
(2011) and by Lacity et al. (2011) are complementary rather than competing strategies. KarimiAlaghehband et al. (2011) call for a more refined and more rigorous operationalizations of TCE
constructs. Consistent with this, we show and agree that the operationalization of TU constructs was
and still potentially is an important issue in ITO research.
Lacity et al. (2011) call for the development of an “endogenous” ITO theory to replace the
analytical framework of TCE. We show that the TCE-based prediction of the choice of CT as a
function of TU is not supported in datasets containing data collected post 1999, independent of the
operationalization of TU. Generalizing this result to the ITO literature, our results support the call by
Lacity et al. (2011) that ITO research requires a new analytical framework to further develop the
theory of ITO and to provide sound guidance to the ITO industry.
Limitations
The meta-analysis presented above is subject to a number of limitations. Five are reviewed
here. First, it is not possible to know that all empirical research studies on the relationship between
TU and choice of CT in ITO research were identified and included in the final meta-analytical dataset.
Although we conducted an extensive literature search, the possibility remains that we did not identify
all relevant studies. In addition, some studies did not report the necessary statistics and, thus, were not
included in the meta-analysis dataset. However, considering the extensive nature of our literature
search process, we are confident that any excluded studies would not substantially affect the results
presented above.
Second, to address the file-drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979), we searched extensively for
conference papers, dissertations, and working papers. Twenty-eight percent of the studies included in
the meta-analysis fall into these three categories. We are confident that the file-drawer problem is not
a potential major validity threat to the findings.
Third, although the coding of TU resulted in high inter-coder reliability, the process of
designing the coding scheme itself involved some subjectivity. To mitigate this risk, the variables
were assigned to the operationalizations of TU based on their explicit use in primary studies. When
this was in any doubt, the assignment was discussed and resolved between two of the authors.
Fourth, we corrected the variables for only three statistical artifacts that are present in each
study: sampling error, measurement error of TU, and measurement error of choice of CT. Hunter and
Schmidt (2004) describe procedures to correct for other statistical artifacts including range restriction
and dichotomization of continuous variables. However, information that must be extracted from the
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individual studies to correct for these artifacts is rarely available and is, thus, beyond the scope of this
meta-analysis.
Fifth, estimates of the expected rhos (𝜌), particularly in the analysis of the different
operationalizations of TU, are based on a small number of effect sizes. While a small number of effect
sizes does not bias the estimates of the 𝜌, it may affect the estimates of the standard deviation of 𝜌
that are used to calculate the credibility intervals (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). However, we calculated
two additional meta-analytic measures to assess the generalizability of the results. All three measures,
the 80-percent credibility interval around 𝜌 (𝐶𝑅2;.;< ), the percentage of variance that is accounted for
by statistical artifacts (%𝑉), and Cochran’s (1954) chi-square statistic for heterogeneity (𝑄), produce
consistent results. There is no evidence of bias in the findings.
In addition, our sampling frame, the relationship of TU and choice of CT, may limit the
generalizability of the findings. The results reported above may not generalize to TCE-based
relationships in the rest of the ITO literature. Against this threat, the meta-analytical dataset examined
here can be treated as a stratified random sample from the ITO literature in terms of the proportion of
the TCE-based relationships that are not supported.
Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) report that 44% of TCE-based hypotheses are not supported
and Lacity et al. (2011) report that 51% of TCE-based hypotheses are not supported. Partitioning the
correlations in our meta-analytical dataset between those that significantly support and those that do
not significantly support the logic of TCE, 41% support the logic of TCE and 59% do not support the
logic of TCE. These proportions are not significantly different from those reported by KarimiAlaghehband et al. (2011) and by Lacity et al. (2011). So, the results reported here are unlikely to be
specific to the relationship of TU and choice of CT, and are expected to generalize to other TCEbased relationships in ITO. However, future research should investigate this assumption.
Implications for Theory and Practice
The results above have implications for the two strategies proposed to resolve the
inconsistencies in TCE-based relationships in the ITO literature. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011)
call for more rigorous application of TCE in ITO research. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results
presented here, the effect of the operationalization of TU in the research stream on the choice of CT,
support their conclusions that the variance in findings is, at least partially, a function of construct
validity threats. This conclusion may also generalize to the findings in other IS research domains.
The findings also show that TCE has become an inappropriate analytical framework for ITO
research. This supports the call by Lacity et al. (2011) for the development of an endogenous theory

16

of ITO. We agree that the search for, or development of, a new analytical framework is critical for
future research on ITO.
The core assumption underpinning the argument by Lacity et al. (2011) is that the ITO industry
has become an industry with characteristics that go beyond the boundary conditions of TCE. For
example, ITO vendors have developed management practices that allow them to “deliver positive
results to clients while still generating positive margins” (Lacity et al., 2011, p. 151) in the
increasingly competitive and consolidated ITO markets (Manning, 2013). In addition, ITO clients are
becoming better informed due to increasing market transparency and increasing experience with ITO
engagements (Reimann et al., 2010). These characteristics affect the trade-offs between monitoring
costs and renegotiation costs, which reduce the benefits from making the choice of CT contingent on
the level of TU.
Specifically, ITO vendors increasingly offer standardized and modularized services that include
detailed project plans, including functional requirements, service levels, and costs (Fink et al., 2013).
These developments reduce the extent to which clients need to implement additional monitoring of
vendor behavior. In addition, management practices, including technology enablement and IT factory
facilities, provide extensive built-in monitoring capabilities for the client (Grönroos, 2011; Lacity et
al., 2011).
Renegotiation costs are incurred from adjusting the specification of an ITO engagement when
facing unforeseen contingencies (Hoermann et al., 2015). Standardized and modularized services
decouple the production of ITO services from particular ITO engagements and clients (Manning,
2013). This enables ITO vendors to customize and adapt ITO service offerings more efficiently.
Furthermore, standardized and modularized services have enabled ITO vendors to develop contractual
governance mechanisms, including reliable risk buffers, and to price the costs for unforeseen
contingencies into the contracts, independent of contract type. These developments have reduced the
differential renegotiation costs under TM contracts compared with FP contracts.
Historically, ITO clients entered into ITO contracts to improve the cost-efficiency of their IT
operations. Recently, increased market transparency combined with the potential punitive loss of
reputation from opportunistic vendor behavior have reduced the historical monitoring costs of TM
contracts, reducing the need for clients to control vendor behavior (Dibbern et al., 2004). In addition,
ITO clients now engage in co-creation partnerships with ITO vendors to deliver high ITO
performance (Sarker et al., 2012; Vargo and Lusch, 2007). In combination, these developments have
shifted the intent for both vendors and clients from improving the efficiency of ITO transactions to
developing value-creating relationships.
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The diminishing relevance of TCE, as argued by Lacity et al. (2011) and confirmed by our
research, is in part a function of the increasing maturity of the ITO industry. Other IS researchers have
commented on this increased maturity (See Manning et al., 2011; Stadtmann and Kreutter, 2009;
Suarez et al., 2013). Our findings are also consistent with research on the relevance of TCE to IS
reference disciplines (See, for example, Agarwal et al., 2002; Argyres and Bigelow, 2007;
Karniouchina et al., 2013; Misangyi et al., 2006; Suarez et al., 2013). For example, in the automotive
industry, Argyres and Bigelow (2007) show that the effect of transaction misalignment on firm
survival varies across different phases of maturity. They conclude that the explanatory power of TCE
is contingent on the maturity of an industry. Our results generalize this conclusion to the ITO
industry.
It is interesting to speculate about why the inconsistent findings reported by KarimiAlaghehband et al. (2011) and Lacity et al. (2011) had not been investigated earlier. To explore one
potential explanation, consider the following evidence. Of the 28 studies in our final meta-analytical
dataset, 17 studies use CT as a control variable and do not test the relationship explicitly. The studies
use CT to control for differential governance modes.
We assume that, prior to the reviews by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and Lacity et al.
(2011), the null findings for the correlation between TU and CT post 1999 were not salient to
researchers because CT was included in the analysis only as a control variable. So, ITO researchers
did not recognize the potential importance of the cumulative null findings for the effect of TU on
choice of CT. A similar explanation could also apply to the cumulative null findings in other ITObased research domains as reported in the two reviews that had not been recognized previously.
Accepting the challenge proposed by Lacity et al. (2011), the critical question for future
research on ITO is: What would be the components and the form of an “endogenous” ITO theory? By
its name, TCE is fundamentally about costs. Within the TCE framework, the choice of CT is not
about improving the quality of the service but about reducing transaction costs to improve market
efficiency. We speculate that within the new “endogenous” ITO framework, the challenge would be
to explain how to create value in ITO engagements.
For example, Gopal and Koka (2012) and Hoberg et al. (2013) report that relational flexibility
is a major driver of ITO performance. This suggests that an alternative analytical framework would
focus on collaborative behavior between clients and vendors as opposed to a market-based and
potentially adversarial relationship. Consistent with this framing, (Dibbern et al., 2004) argue that, in
a transparent and competitive market, ITO vendors are motivated to propose a contract that enables
the client to leverage the vendor’s specific expertise to create value. So, vendors should offer and
clients should choose contracts that help to build flexible, effective relational governance to leverage
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the vendor capabilities to create value for the client. This would transform models of vendor/client
relationships from cost-based market relationships to value-based collaborative relationships.
The domain of ITO, similar to other domains in IT research, is subject to the rapid changes and
the constant adaptation of organizations to new economic, social, and technological realities (Gable,
2010; Merali et al., 2012; Ward, 2012). In these domains, IS researchers must always examine the,
often implicit, boundaries of applied theoretical frameworks. Such frameworks that have been useful
lenses in the past may offer inconclusive or even misleading insights in the future. We argue that the
search for ‘expiration dates’ of theoretical frameworks is a critical avenue of research to advance both
the rigor and the relevance of IS research to strategic decision-making. Reviewing the core
assumptions and boundaries of theoretical frameworks potentially improves the validity and relevance
for IS executives to prepare “strategic decisions and control their effects” (Buhl et al., 2012, p. 176).

CONCLUSION
This study presents support for the two explanations by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and
by Lacity et al. (2011) for the inconsistent findings in ITO research when TCE is adopted as the
analytical framework. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) explain the inconsistent findings in terms of
measurement errors and construct validity threats. They call for more rigorous research methodology
to reduce inconsistent findings in the future. Supporting their conclusion and call, we show that the
inconsistent findings on the relationship between TU and the choice of CT are contingent on how TU
is operationalized.
Lacity et al. (2011) explain the inconsistent findings by arguing that TCE is no longer an
appropriate analytical framework for ITO research. They call for the development of a new analytical
framework. Consistent with their explanation and call, we show that the effect of TU on the choice of
CT is contingent on the period of investigation. In recent studies compared with early research, TU
has a significantly weaker and potentially null effect on the choice of CT, independent of how TU is
operationalized.
This paper is not a test of TCE but rather of its relevance to investigating critical issues in ITO
research. We conclude that it was relevant in the early period of ITO but is not relevant today.
Generalizing our findings to the ITO literature, we agree with Lacity et al. (2011) that TCE is no
longer a relevant and appropriate analytical framework for ITO research. Identifying and integrating
the core constructs and core relationships of ITO into an effective analytical framework is necessary
to further develop the theory of ITO and to provide guidance for both vendors and clients.
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Consequently, a critical challenge for ITO research is to develop a new rigorous and powerful
analytical framework.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1.

Overview of Independent Samples

Period of
Investigation
1986-1998

1989-2009
1989-2011
1993-2003
1994-2006
1994-2006
1995-1997
1996-2001
1996-2005
1997-1998
1998-2004
2000-2003
2001-2001
2001-2004
2002-2003
2002-2006
2004-2006

2005-2010
2006-2006
2007-2008
2008-2008
2008-2011
𝐍𝑺𝑨 = 22

Studies using the same Sample
Kalnins and Mayer (2004)
Argyres et al. (2007)
Weber et al. (2011)
Bapna et al. (2012)
Chen and Heng (2012)
Chen and Bharadwaj (2009a)
Chen and Bharadwaj (2009b)
Subramanyam and Susarla (2011)
Ramachandran and Gopal (2010)
Gopal and Koka (2012)
Ethiraj et al. (2005)
Mani et al. (2013)
Banerjee and Duflo (2000)
Susarla (2012)
Gefen et al. (2008)
Susarla et al. (2009)
Rai et al. (2009)
Tiwana (2008a)
Langer (2007)
Huckman and Staats (2011)
Staats et al. (2011)*
Staats et al. (2012)
Hoermann et al. (2012)
Tiwana (2008b)
Tiwana (2010)
Srivastava and Teo (2012)
Maruping and Ahuja (2012)
Ramasubbu et al. (2011)
𝐍𝑰𝑺 = 28

𝑵𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒚

𝑬𝑺

394
386
385
753
945
112
153
100
85
105
138
100
167
141
238
153
155
209
530
562
727
1,203
1,118
81
120
120
160
87
424

5
3
3
4
3
1
3
3
3
5
3
3
5
4
3
2
6
3
4
1
1
1
4
1
3
2
2
6
5
𝐍𝑬𝑺 =
92

𝝆

.19

.11
.10
.44
.09
.18
-.04
.09
.02
-.04
.22
.18
.05
.04
-.14
.00
.09

.23
.08
-.12
-.07
.04

Period of Investigation: ITO engagements for this sample fall into this timeframe; Studies using the same Sample: Multiple studies based
on the same sample were included only when each of the studies reports at least one operationalization of TU that is not reported in the other
studies. For instance, Kalnins and Mayer (2004), Argyres et al. (2007), and Weber et al. (2011) use the same sample but examine different
aspects of ITO engagements. All three studies have a shared set of variables but each study provides a unique set of variables related to one
ore more operationalization of TU; 𝑵𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒚 : Subset of ITO engagements used in study; 𝑬𝑺: Effect sizes extracted from study (i.e., correlation
coefficients of a variable related to task uncertainty and CT); 𝝆: Average corrected correlation (expected rho) of TU and CT; 𝐍𝑺𝑨 : Number
of independent samples included in the final meta-analytical dataset; 𝐍𝑰𝑺 : Number of studies included in the final meta-analytical dataset;
𝐍𝑬𝑺 : Number of (potentially interdependent) effect sizes included in the final meta-analytical dataset; *: Staats et al. (2011) use different
sample sizes for different variables in their analysis. See Dongus (2016) for the full meta-analytical sample.
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Appendix 2.

Definitions and Coding Examples for the Operationalizations of Task
Uncertainty

Operationalization of TU
Technological uncertainty

Requirements uncertainty

Definition
Uncertainty that stems from
low experience with the
technologies employed in
the project (Nidumolu,
1995)
Uncertainty regarding the
client’s requirements
(Nidumolu, 1995)

Technological complexity

Multiplicity and
interdependence between
different elements of the
solution (Xia and Lee,
2005)

Organizational complexity

Multiplicity and
interdependence between
different elements of the
organizational environment
(Xia and Lee, 2005)

Project size

Size of the project (Argyres
et al., 2007)
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Coding examples
Technology knowledge of vendor
(e.g., Banerjee and Duflo, 2000;
Kalnins and Mayer, 2004); perceived
technological uncertainty (e.g.,
Maruping and Ahuja, 2012)
Goal codifiability (e.g., Susarla et al.,
2009; Tiwana, 2010); incomplete
specification (e.g., Gopal and Koka,
2012; Susarla, 2012); extent of
change requests (e.g., Huckman and
Staats, 2011; Rai et al., 2009);
outcome measurability (e.g., Kalnins
and Mayer, 2004)
Breadth of tasks (e.g., Chen and
Bharadwaj, 2009a; Susarla, 2012);
type of task (e.g., Bapna et al., 2012;
Langer et al., 2008); functions points
(e.g., Ethiraj et al., 2005; Rai et al.,
2009); perceived technological
complexity (e.g., Gefen et al., 2008)
Team size (e.g., Staats et al., 2012);
multiplicity of vendors and clients
involved (e.g., Maruping and Ahuja,
2012); temporal and geographical
dispersion (e.g., Maruping and
Ahuja, 2012; Weber et al., 2011);
offshore percentage (e.g., Chen and
Heng, 2012; Staats et al., 2012)
Effort (e.g., Ethiraj et al., 2005;
Staats et al., 2011); duration (e.g.,
Mani et al., 2012; Staats et al., 2012);
monetary value (e.g., Argyres et al.,
2007; Ramachandran and Gopal,
2010)

Appendix 3.

Mapping of Study Variables to the Different Operationalizations of Task
Uncertainty

Variable
Description
𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅
Technological Uncertainty (𝐤 = 𝟓, 𝐍 = 𝟏, 𝟑𝟏𝟐)
392
Programming
Whether project involves programming

Study
Kalnins and
Mayer (2004)

Vendor hardware

Whether project involves vendor
hardware

Kalnins and
Mayer (2004)

Vendor proprietary
technology

Whether project involves vendor
proprietary technology

Kalnins and
Mayer (2004)

Innovation

Degree to which the project required
innovation

Argyres et al.
(2007)

Application area
familiar to the firm

Whether the firm has experience with
the application

Banerjee and
Duflo (2000)

Programming tools
familiar to the firm

Whether the firm has experience with
the programming tools

Banerjee and
Duflo (2000)

Platform familiar to
the firm

Whether the firm has experience with
the platform

Banerjee and
Duflo (2000)

209

Outsourcee ignorance

Reverse score of the outsourcee firm’s
knowledge

Tiwana (2008a)

120

Vendor domain
knowledge

Items for measuring domain knowledge

Tiwana (2010)

424

Newness

Experience with technology

Ramasubbu et al.
(2011)

167

Requirements Uncertainty (𝐤 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝐍 = 𝟐, 𝟑𝟎𝟏)
394
Difficulty to measure
Whether the technology used in the
quality
project made it difficult to determine
the quality

Kalnins and
Mayer (2004)

105

Requirements
instability

Four adapted questionnaire items

Gopal and Koka
(2012)

141

Complexity

Incomplete specification or
transformational project

Susarla (2012)

153

Service uncertainty

Difficulty to estimate project
specification

Susarla et al.
(2009)

155

Requirements
uncertainty

Number of formal written changes

Rai et al. (2009)
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𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅
562

Variable
Task change

Description
Percentage of requirements that have
changed in the project

Study
Huckman and
Staats (2011)

120

Project goal
codifiability

Extent of written documentation

Tiwana (2010)

160

Knowledge stickiness

Availability of documentation and
manuals

Srivastava and
Teo (2012)

87

Requirement clarity

Simplicity of requirements, easy project
guidelines, and clarity of specifications

Maruping and
Ahuja (2012)

424

Requirement volatility

Effort spent on rework due to changes

Ramasubbu et al.
(2011)

Technological Complexity (𝐤 = 𝟏𝟓, 𝐍 = 𝟒, 𝟒𝟐𝟎 )
394
Customer mainframe
Whether project involves client
mainframe technology
95

Kalnins and
Mayer (2004)

Technological
complexity

Whether the technological environment
would be a source of problems during
the project

Ramachandran
and Gopal (2010)

Project type

New development or reengineering

Gopal and Koka
(2012)

167

Y2K, CAD, Web
Pages

Classes of project technology
complexity

Banerjee and
Duflo (2000)

138

Project size and
complexity

Number of function points

Ethiraj et al.
(2005)

753

Number of
subsegments

Number of distinct IT tasks/activities

Bapna et al.
(2012)

Engagement type
complexity

Complexity categories

Bapna et al.
(2012)

153

Task complexity

Items for complexity of software
development

Chen and
Bharadwaj
(2009b)

945

Number of functions

Number of IT functions outsourced

Chen and Heng
(2012)

100

Problem solving
complexity

Items to measure task-specific variables

Subramanyam
and Susarla
(2011)

100

Type of outsourcing

Complexity categories

Mani et al. (2013)
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𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅

Variable
initiative

Description

Study

141

Breadth of service

Sum of services performed by the
vendor

Susarla (2012)

238

Perceived software
complexity

Items to measure interconnectivity
between modules

Gefen et al.
(2008)

Perceived software
complexity

Items to measure module complexity

Gefen et al.
(2008)

155

Project complexity

Number of adjusted function points

Rai et al. (2009)

530

Log of FP

Function points associated with the
project

Langer (2007)

Project technology

Low level or high level programming
language

Langer (2007)

87

Technological
complexity

Measured on a five-item scale

Maruping and
Ahuja (2012)

424

Project size

Forward counted function points

Ramasubbu et al.
(2011)

Organizational Complexity (𝒌 = 𝟏𝟒, 𝑵 = 𝟒, 𝟐𝟔𝟗)
385.3
Interdependence
Customer personnel are listed as being
responsible for some deliverables

Argyres et al.
(2007)

Any-office-50

Vendor office within 50 miles

Weber et al.
(2011)

Minimum distance

Geographic distance between client and
closest vendor office

Weber et al.
(2011)

105

Team size

Number of team members

Gopal and Koka
(2012)

138

Team size

Number of team members

Ethiraj et al.
(2005)

153

Offshore (dummy
variable)

Software developed in the US versus
outside the US

Chen and
Bharadwaj
(2009b)

945

Offshore

Service by offshoring/onshore vendor
or domestic vendor

Chen and Heng
(2012)

100

Anticipated
coordination

Anticipated interdependence based on
the strategic rationale for outsourcing

Mani et al. (2013)
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𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅
155

Variable
requirements

Description

Study

Client representative

Whether a project team had a client
representative present or not

Rai et al. (2009)

Client-meet

Number of visits by the client

Rai et al. (2009)

Team-meet

Number of visits to the client site

Rai et al. (2009)

209

Outsourcer liaison
team size

Number of team members

Tiwana (2008a)

530

Team size

Number of people who have been
allocated to the project

Langer (2007)

1,118

Team size

Number of team members

Staats et al.
(2012)

SoftCo percentage

Coordination complexity due to
employees working at different
locations

Staats et al.
(2012)

120

Project team size

Number of team members

Tiwana (2008b)

160

Team size

Number of vendor employees

Srivastava and
Teo (2012)

87

Temporal dispersion

Number of time zones spanned

Maruping and
Ahuja (2012)

Client participation

Proportion of offshore IS project team
members

Maruping and
Ahuja (2012)

Organizational
complexity

Multiplicity of contractors and vendors
and multiplicity of client units involved

Maruping and
Ahuja (2012)

Team size

Full time headcount

Ramasubbu et al.
(2011)

Client involvement

Effort spent on engaging with end users

Ramasubbu et al.
(2011)

Total monetary value of the project

Argyres et al.
(2007)

Duration

Number of weeks to complete the
project

Weber et al.
(2011)

Duration

Number of calendar days

Gopal and Koka
(2012)

424

Project Size (𝐤 = 𝟐𝟎, 𝐍 = 𝟓, 𝟕𝟎𝟒)
385.5
Dollar value

95

26

𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅
Effort

Description
Measured in function points

Study
Gopal and Koka
(2012)

Cost

Total development cost

Ramachandran
and Gopal (2010)

Financial risk

Risk in comparison to other projects of
the vendor

Ramachandran
and Gopal (2010)

167

Project size

Duration in person-months

Banerjee and
Duflo (2000)

112

Contract duration

Number of months in contract

Chen and
Bharadwaj
(2009a)

138

Person-months

Number of person-months

Ethiraj et al.
(2005)

753

Length

Total length of the contract in months

Bapna et al.
(2012)

Contract value

Dollar value of the contract

Bapna et al.
(2012)

153

Contract duration

Duration is greater than 12 months or
not

Chen and
Bharadwaj
(2009b)

945

Log of contract length

Duration in months

Chen and Heng
(2012)

100

Duration

Length of the contract

Subramanyam
and Susarla
(2011)

Contract value

Monetary value of the project

Subramanyam
and Susarla
(2011)

100

Expectation of
continuity of the
relationship

Length of the contract in months

Mani et al. (2013)

141

Contract length

Length is greater than 3 years or not

Susarla (2012)

Contract value

Log of the monetary value

Susarla (2012)

Length

Duration in years

Susarla et al.
(2009)

153

Variable
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𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅
238

Variable
Project duration

Description
Time invested

Study
Gefen et al.
(2008)

155

Project size

Size in lines of code

Rai et al. (2009)

209

Project duration

Duration in months

Tiwana (2008a)

530

Duration

Duration in months

Langer (2007)

1,041.5

KLOC

Size in kilolines of code

Staats et al.
(2011)

Effort

Duration in hours

Staats et al.
(2011)

Log of estimated effort

Duration in person minutes

Staats et al.
(2012)

Log of estimated
duration

Time to complete the project

Staats et al.
(2012)

Project alliance scope

Project size in comparison to other
projects

Tiwana (2008b)

Project duration

Duration in months

Tiwana (2008b)

81

Project size

Estimated volume of the project

Hoermann et al.
(2012)

87

Project size

Total cost of the project in US dollars

Maruping and
Ahuja (2012)

120

𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅 : We combined variables from studies analyzing the same sample by averaging the 𝑁‰EŠ%‹ across all included variables.
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Appendix 4.

Sensitivity Analysis Controlling for Start Year of Sample (SYS)
𝝆

𝑺𝑫𝝆

2,788
3,460

.15
.05

.07
.09

.09 :
-.01 :

10
12

2,955
3,293

.14
.06

.08
.09

SYS ≤ 1999
SYS > 1999

11
11

3,096
3,152

.15
.05

SYS ≤ 2000
SYS > 2000

12
10

3,334
2,914

SYS ≤ 2001
SYS > 2001

14
8

3,642
2,606

𝒌

𝑵

SYS ≤ 1996
SYS > 1996

9
13

SYS ≤ 1997
SYS > 1997

𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓

𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎

%𝑽

𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏

𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏

.22
.12

.06 : .24
-.06 : .17

.50
.44

17.49*
29.55*

9.15*

.07 :
-.01 :

.21
.13

.04 : .25
-.05 : .17

.46
.42

21.42*
28.40*

6.37*

.08
.08

.08 :
-.01 :

.21
.11

.05 : .25
-.05 : .15

.47
.45

22.92*
24.18*

9.09*

.15
.04

.07
.07

.09 :
-.03 :

.21
.10

.05 : .25
-.05 : .13

.50
.51

23.71*
19.44*

13.56*

.14
.04

.08
.08

.08 :
-.03 :

.20
.11

.04 : .24
-.06 : .14

.49
.42

27.97*
18.73*

9.68*

𝒌: Number of effect sizes; 𝑵: Total sample size; 𝝆: Expected rho; 𝑺𝑫𝝆 : Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓 : 95% confidence interval around 𝜌;
𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎 : 80% credibility interval around 𝜌; %𝑽: Percentage of variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts; 𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 : Cochran’s chisquare statistic for heterogeneity that remains within the subset; 𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 : Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained
by the SYS; *: 𝑝-value of 𝑄 < 0.05.
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